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AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL CHALLENGES FACED
BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS: HOW COURTS TREAT
THE GROWING NUMBER OF GAY FAMILIES
Erica is an expectant mother. Like many expectant mothers, Erica
is filled with excitement. She is preparing the baby's room, picking out
names, stocking-up on diapers. She attends Lamaze classes. Erica is
thrilled by listening to the baby's heartbeat or feeling it kick., Erica is not
pregnant. She has not hired a surrogate mother.' Erica is a lesbian. Her
life partner, Monique, is carrying the baby that the couple considers their
child.' Erica and Monique have been together for five years. They own
a house together in the suburbs. Erica teaches at a local college; Monique
is an attorney.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "non-traditional family" which once referred only to
single-parent and step-parent families, has been expanded to refer to
different types of families, including those with one or more gay parent.'
While there are no concrete numbers available, it is estimated that between
six and fourteen million children in the United States have at least one gay
parent. The numbers are said to be increasing.5
This note uses the term "gay" to refer to homosexual men or women, "lesbian" to
refer to homosexual women, and "life partner" or "partner" to identify the person with whom
a gay man or lesbian woman is in a long-term committed relationship.
2Erica and Monique are not real; they are a composite of many lesbian parents in the
United States; see infra, section I.A.
3 Elizabeth Delaney, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing
the Relationship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
177, 177 (1991).
'Barbara Kantrowitz, Gay Families Come Out, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1996 at 50, 52.;
Deidre Larkin Runnette, Judicial Discretion and the Homosexual Parent: How Montana
Courts are and Should be Considering a Parent's Sexual Orientation in Contested Custody
Cases, 57 MoNT. L.REv. 177, 180 (1996).
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Gay and lesbian families come about in a number of different
ways.6  Historically, most gay and lesbian parents were previously in
heterosexual marriages that ended in divorce.7 After the divorce, these
parents often identify themselves as gay or lesbian.
Recently, however, gay and lesbian couples are starting their own
families8 -- in a variety of ways. Some lesbian couples are using artificial
insemination to impregnate one of the partners. The sperm may be
obtained through a sperm bank," a friend,10 or a family member of the non-
carrying partner." Gay and lesbian couples are adopting children from
both the U.S. and foreign countries.' Gay men have also hired surrogate
mothers. 3
Research shows that children reared by gay and lesbian parents
fair no worse than their peers raised by heterosexual parents.'" These
children are "no more likely to have psychological problems" than children
raised by heterosexual parents." Children of gay parents are similar to
children of heterosexual parents in terms of intelligence, peer relations,
' Kantrowitz, supra note 4, at 52, Delaney, supra note 3, at 178 (stating that the
increase is due both to the fact that gay and lesbian parents are more open about their status than
they were in the past, and that more gay and lesbian couples are choosing to start their own
families).
6 Joseph P. Shapiro & Stephen Gregory, Kids with Gay Parents, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept., 16, 1996 at 75, 76.
7 Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and other Non-Traditional Families, 78
GEO. L.J. 459, 464-65 (1990); Delaney, supra note 3, at 177-78.
8 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 466.
'Id.; Kantrowitz, supra note 4, at 52.
'0 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 466.
"See, e.g., In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).
12 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 466; Kantrowitz, supra note 4, at 52.
3 HAYDEN CURRY ETAL.,ALEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 3-20 (8th
ed. 1994).
4 Daniel Goleman, Studies Find No Disadvantage In Growing Up in a Gay Home,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1992 at C14; Shapiro & Gregory, supra note 6, at 75. For an excellent
review of research in this area see Douglas H. McIntyre, Gay Parents and Child Custody: A
Struggle Under the Legal System, 12 MEDIATION QUARTERLY 135 (1994).
' Goleman, supra note 14, at C14.
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and development of sexual identity. 6 There are also no differences in sex-
role behaviors between children of gay parents and children of
heterosexual parents." Furthermore, children of gay parents are no more
likely to be gay than are children of heterosexual parents. 8 Despite this
research, many courts continue to deny gay and lesbian parents the same
rights heterosexual parents have. Many courts presume that an individual
is an unfit parent because he or she is gay. 19 This presumption and its
effects are manifested in a variety of legal issues faced by gay and lesbian
parents.2"
Gay and lesbian parents previously in heterosexual marriages face
challenges to their custody and visitation rights because of their sexuality.2 1
If these parents are given custody, they still face problems if later, in a
committed relationship they want to protect their family by providing the
new partner legal rights to make decisions for the child." Each partner of
a gay or lesbian couple that starts a family is not automatically granted
equal legal parental status; it is presumed that only one person of each
gender can be a child's parent. 3 The mother who carries the child is the
only biological, and therefore, legal parent. 4  The father whose name
16 Shapiro & Gregory, supra note 6, at 75, 76.
17 McIntyre, supra note 14, at 139.
'8 Richard Green, M.D., The Best Interest of the Child with a Lesbian Mother, 10
BULL. AMER. AcAD. PSYCH. & L. 8 (1982); Goleman, supra note 14, at C14.
'9 See G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App 1987) (upholding an award of
custody to a child's father because of a conclusory presumption that the mother is unfit because
she is a lesbian); S.L.H. v. D.B.H., 745 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. Ct. App 1988) (stating that it is in the
best interest of the child to place primary custody "with the nonhomosexual parent..."). But see
Nadler v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Ct. App. 1967) (overturning a custody decision
because the trial court had failed to exercise discretion in determining the best interest of child
by holding as a matter of law that the child's mother was an unfit parent because she is a
lesbian).
20 See infra sections II, III and IV.
21 See infra section 11.
22 See infra section III.B.
23 See infra section III.B.
4Elizabeth Zuckerman, Comment, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented
Families: LegalRecognition of the Other Mother, 19 U. C. DAVIS L. REv. 729, 730 (1986).
19981 723
724 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIV
appears on the adoption papers is the child's only legal parent.25
This note discusses the legal rights of gay and lesbian families. It
analyzes how the law has developed in response to the growing frequency
of these "non-traditional" families. Further, this note proposes that while
extending to gay and lesbian families the same rights and responsibilities
afforded to so-called "traditional" families is in the best interest of the
children, courts are not consistently doing this." Part II discusses the
rights of gays and lesbians in regard to their own biological children, born
out of heterosexual unions." It analyzes challenges made to the parent's
custody and visitation rights as made by the non-gay biological parent as
well as by a non-parent relative or guardian of the child.28 This section
discusses the two tests courts use in determining how and whether a
parent's sexuality effects custody and visitation decisions.29 Part III
discusses the rights of gays and lesbians who wish to adopt. 0 This section
addresses both so-called "stranger" adoption, where the adoptive child is
not biologically related to either parent, and "second parent" adoptions,
where one partner wishes to legally adopt the other partner's biological or
previously adopted child." Part IV briefly discusses the custody and
visitation concerns that arise when second parent adoptions are not made
and the relationship between the partners ends, either through breakup or
through the death of one of the partners.32 Finally, Part V concludes that
while many advances have been made in the rights of gays and lesbians,
there is still much ground to be covered." Legal rights for gay and lesbian
parents are not provided consistently from state to state, and even within
each state from issue to issue.14
23 Cf Id. at 731, 734.
26See infra sections II, III and IV.
17 See infra section II.
28 Id.
29 id.
31 See infra section II.
31 id.
32 See infra section IV.
31 See infra section V.
34 Id.
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II. BIOLOGICAL PARENTS - MAINTAINING THE PARENT-CHILD BOND
Research shows that children who maintain a relationship with
both parents following the parents' divorce or separation are better
adjusted than their peers who do not continue relationships with both
parents." When both parents want to maintain custody of or visitation
with the child, courts must weigh a variety of factors in deciding how and
to whom to award custody and visitation rights. 6 The court's goal is
usually defined in terms of seeking to provide for the best interests of the
child." Gay and lesbian parents of children from heterosexual unions face
many challenges and much discrimination in these battles. 8 They may be
presumed unfit because they are gay or lesbian. 9 This section discusses
these challenges and how the courts treat the issue of homosexuality of a
parent. Issues of custody and visitation are treated separately.
" McIntyre, supra note 14, at 135.
36 PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIAL AND PROBLEMS 1040
(1990) (stating that while courts have discussed the factors to be considered in custody decisions,
a great deal of deference is given to the trial courts).
" Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay Parents
and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623,628 (1996).
38See generally id.; David S. Dooley, Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad Because
They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions of Parental Unfitness in Custody
Disputes, 26 CAL. W. L. REv. 395 (1989-1990).
39 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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A. Parental Custody Decisions
During custody disputes, courts weigh a variety of factors to
determine "the best interests of the child. '"4° These factors include the
home environment that will be provided for the child,4' the level of care
and attention the child receives from the parent,42 and the amount of time
the parent can spend with the child. 43 Also considered are the parent's
stability," the closeness of the relationship between the parent and the
child,45 and even the parent's sexual conduct" and prior criminal history.'
In a custody dispute between one gay or lesbian parent and a heterosexual
parent, courts are often forced to consider factors not ordinarily before
them; for example, one parent may believe that the other parent will not
provide a moral upbringing for the child because the one parent believes
the other's sexuality is immoral. 4' The non-gay parent may also question
the impact the gay parent's sexuality may have on the child's upbringing
in terms of potentially exposing the child to ridicule.4 9
Courts generally apply two different tests for determining whether
a factor such as a parent's homosexuality is determinative in denying
custody to that parent -- the nexus test and the per se rule.
1. The Nexus Test
The nexus test requires a clear relationship between a parent's
40 SWISHER, supra note 36, at 1040.
41 White v. Thompson, 660 So.2d 1342 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995).
42 Id.
4' Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah 1996).
44Id.
45 Id.
46Id. at 1213. (stating that the plaintiffs sexual conduct is considered by the court in
custody disputes).
7 Ward v. Ward, 1996 W.L. 491692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of App. 1996) (awarding custody
to the heterosexual father despite his criminal record).
48S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64,65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
4 S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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homosexuality and harm to the child before custody is denied to the parent
on the basis of that factor." Several courts have relied on this test in
custody decisions.',
The Supreme Court of Alaska actively advocated using this test in
S.N.E. v. R.L.B 2 In S.N.E., the court maintained a prior custody decree
awarding custody to a lesbian mother, noting that despite overwhelming
evidence that the mother is a lesbian, there was no testimony as to a
negative effect on the child." Because the mother already had custody of
the child, there was insufficient evidence to merit changing that decree."
S.N.E. is an example of the nexus test appropriately applied. In
the absence of proof of actual harm or significant potential for harm
resulting from a certain factor in this specific case, the court refused to
hold such a factor dispositive in its decision.
While the nexus test is generally a good approach, this test has at
times been misapplied by courts." The misapplication of this test can be
seen in the Kentucky Court of Appeals case, S. v. S.16 The court in S. v. S.
stated that in order to change the current custody decree from the lesbian
mother to the heterosexual father, there must be evidence that the current
situation may harm the child." The court disagreed with the mother's
argument that there must be evidence of existing harm to the child. 8 The
court based its decision to change the custody decree to the father on
testimony given by a psychologist regarding the potential harm to the child
from the social stigma of homosexuality in general." There was no
" Shapiro, supra note 37, at 636 (stating that the "nexus" test can assist courts in
ascertaining the best interests of the child).
" E.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 878 (Alaska 1985); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286,
292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
" 699 P.2d 878.
"Id. at 879.
54 Id.
" Shapiro, supra note 37, at 641-42 (stating that due to courts' ongoing speculation
and deference, gay and lesbian parents are inevitably harmed in custody disputes).
" 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
57 Id. at 65.
58 Id.
591Id. at 66.
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discussion as to whether such social stigmatization actually harmed the
child, or whether the child in the present case even encountered such
stigmatization. 6° In fact, the court-appointed psychologist did not even
interview the child.6' The decision to remove custody from the mother
was based on speculation of future social stigmatization without review of
the mother's ability to protect the child from such stigmatization. 62 There
was no discussion on appeal of any other factors that may influence the
custody decision.,3
The nexus test helps courts determine the appropriate placement
of the child. Accordingly, it does not mean that custody is always awarded
to the gay or lesbian parent. Rather, when applied appropriately, it means
that the fact that a parent is gay or lesbian is irrelevant unless this causes
harm to the child.
In a highly-publicized Florida case," the District Court of Appeals
awarded custody to a father who had, prior to the birth of the child, spent
eight and one-half years in jail for murdering his first wife.6' The child's
mother, with whom the child had resided prior to this decision, was a
lesbian.6 The child, who was eleven years old, had become disruptive and
had made what the father had considered inappropriate sexual comments
and gestures during visits with the father and his new wife.67 According
to the father, the child stated that the mother and the mother's partner
sleep together and do the things shown in the R-rated movies the father
would not allow the child to see.6 The child also undressed a doll she was
playing with and placed her fingers between the doll's legs. 9 When she
was told that this behavior was not "'nice for little girls to do.' the child
60d.
61 S., 608 S.W.2d at 65.
62 See generally S., 608 S.W.2d at 64.
63 Id.
6 Ward v. Ward, 1996 W.L. 491692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of App. 1996).
65 d. at * 1.
66 Id.
67 Id. at *2.
68Id.
69 1996 W.L. 491692 at *2.
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responded "'I'm not nice."'70 Conversely, the mother stated that the child
was not aware of the mother's sexual orientation, was not exposed to
sexual behavior in the home, and was not permitted to watch R-rated
movies."
In upholding the trial court's award of custody to the father, the
Court of Appeals stated that the mother's sexual orientation was not the
reason for the change in custody." Rather, the decision was based on
adverse effects of the child's exposure to inappropriate sexual behavior in
general and not that the behavior was of a homosexual nature.73 It is
evident in this case that the child's conduct was improper, likely as a result
of adverse effects of her current life situation.7' The court acknowledged
the mother's argument that the evidence was ambiguous, but gave
deference to the trial court's review of the conflicting evidence.75 Here,
the court applied the nexus test appropriately.
Applied appropriately, the nexus test requires explicit review of
all factors involved in a custody decision. This analysis is truly in the best
interest of the child. However, if used incorrectly, the nexus test provides
the same result as the per se rule under which evidence of the specific case
before the court is not determinative of the result.
2. The Per Se Rule
The per se rule either requires or permits the court to presume that
a parent is unfit because he or she falls into a certain class of persons: here,
homosexuals." By making this presumption, the per se rule denies the
parent the opportunity to present evidence that he or she is a suitable
parent, and perhaps the better custodial parent. Furthermore, the court
does not in turn examine if the parent who is not a member of the defined
70 id.
71 Id.
" Id. at *3.
73 Id.
74 1996 W.L. 491692 at *3.
75 id.
76Shapiro, supra note 37, at 637.
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class is a fit parent. This creates the possibility that custody could be
awarded to a heterosexual parent who is truly unfit, possibly even abusive,
because custody is denied to the other parent, who is gay. The per se rule
cannot be in the best interest of the child because it fails, by definition, to
consider any of the other factors typically involved in custody decisions."
This rule, while overlooking the specifics of a situation and making
judgments against a class of people, has been disguised as making
decisions "in the best interest of the child.. 7
Courts in Missouri apply the per se rule in denying custody to gay
or lesbian parents. 79 The first in a line of Missouri cases is SE.G. v.
R.A.G., in which the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected the mother's
request for application of the nexus test."0 The court stated that the equal
treatment of parents in a custody decision ends if there is evidence that the
child will be harmed if placed with one of the parents. 1 In saying this, the
court appeared to advocate use of the nexus test, requiring that there be
evidence of harm to the child, and a cause/effect relationship between the
harm to the child and the behavior of a parent in order to deny custody to
that parent.82 However, rather than identify the harm to the child and the
relationship between this harm and the mother's behavior, the court
implied the presence of harm based solely on the fact that the mother was
a lesbian and that the mother lived in a small community where the court
says "[h]omosexuality is not openly accepted or widespread"; thus
applying a per se rule.83 The court stated that it wanted to protect the
children from the stigmatization that may occur because of the mother's
lifestyle but had not proof that such stigmatization would occur.4
In a subsequent Missouri case, G.A. v. D.A.,"5 the Missouri Court
7 Dooley, supra note 38, at 404.
78 id.
"E.g., G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
80 S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
81 Id. at 166.
82 id.
83 id.
94 id.
8" 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
730 [Vol. XIV
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of Appeals stated that it agreed with the reasoning of S.E G., "that a court
cannot ignore the effect which the sexual conduct of a parent may have on
a child's moral development." 8 On appeal, the court addressed only two
issues, the quality of housing available to the child and the mother's sexual
orientation. 7 After discussing the issue of housing at great length,88 the
court acknowledged that the welfare of the child goes beyond the child's
physical surroundings, implying that this analysis was of no value.8 9 The
court then upheld the trial court's award of custody to the father based
solely on the mother's sexual orientation without discussion of actual harm
to the child. 0
The danger of the attempted abuse of the per se rule by one parent
against the other can be seen in a subsequent Missouri case.9 In S.L.H. v.
B.D.H.92 a disgruntled father accused his wife of being a lesbian in order
to deny her custody of their child.93 Prior to the divorce proceedings, he
had threatened that he would do whatever it took to get even with her,
including accusing her of having a lesbian relationship.1 The mother and
her alleged partner, a childhood friend, vehemently denied the
accusations.95 The court stated that although "placing primary custody of
a minor child with the non-homosexual parent is in the best interests of the
child," the trial court weighed the evidence and its credibility and had
determined that the wife was not a lesbian." Custody was awarded to the
86 Id. at 728.
87Id.
88 Id at 727. The court stated that at the time of the trial, the mother was living in a
three bedroom house, where the child would have his own room. Id. If custody was awarded
to the father, the boy would have had to live temporarily in his paternal grandparent's trailer
while construction was done on the father's trailer to add a room for the boy. Id.
89 G.A., 745 S.W.2d at 728.
9 Id.
9' S.L.H. v. D.B.H., 745 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
92 Id.
" Id. at 849.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 S.L.H., 745 S.W.2d at 849.
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mother9 and the potential abuse of the per se rule was avoided in this case.
On occasion, a trial court's use of the per se rule has bee rejected
on appeal. In Doe v. Doe98 the Supreme Court of Virginia overturned a
custody hearing that had applied the per se rule in denying custody to a
child's lesbian mother.99 The father relied on a Virginia statute that
criminalized homosexual sex."' The court rejected the idea that the
mother's participation in this activity made her per se unfit. 01 The court
analogized this idea to one it considered illogical, where every individual
who has had a criminal conviction is presumed an unfit parent.0
Arguably, there is some basis for the idea that an individual who
has committed a felony, thereby putting his or her own life at risk, and
actively causing harm to society, will not be able to provide a safe and
appropriate setting in which to raise a child. Certainly harm to the child
is more likely to arise here than from a parent's private sexual behavior;
however, states are inconsistent about application of the per se rule against
persons with prior criminal convictions.0 3 While some states require that
parental rights be terminated if a parent has been convicted of a felony,
most states treat "conviction of the felony and imprisonment [as] one
factor to determine whether or not the parent is unfit. . . .
Absent conclusive evidence that gays and lesbians are uniformly
unfit parents, and bearing in mind that gays and lesbians are as diverse a
group of individuals as are heterosexuals, a rule that presumes that all
members of such group are unfit parents cannot be appropriate. Many
" Id. at 850.
98 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981).
99 Id. at 805-06.
'oo Id. at 805.
' Id. at 806.
102Id.
103 Joseph R. Carrieri, Termination of Parental Rights and Proceedings, in CHILD
ABUsE, NEGLECT AND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM 1996, at 9, 151 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 173, 1996).
"4 Id at 151-152.
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states acknowledge this diversity in their application of the nexus test,05
and all states should require a showing of harm before ruling that one
parent is unfit.
There is no clear rule as to how a parent's homosexuality can
affect a custody hearing, and courts have been inconsistent in their
application of the rules. While there has been no definitive word as to
what is best, the United States Supreme Court has ruled on a similar issue
that courts should apply in these cases. In Palmore v. Sidoti,'°6 race and
not sexuality was the issue.07 In Palmore, following a divorce between a
white couple, the mother was awarded custody of the couple's child.' °0
The mother subsequently lived with and later married a black man."0 The
Florida District Court affirmed the trial court's change of custody to the
father because it was in the best interest of the child to protect the child
from the stigmatization that may ensue if the child is raised by a racially
mixed couple."0 The United States Supreme Court overturned that
decision, stating that the trial court was giving in to society's private bias."'
The Court commented that "[tihe Constitution cannot control such
prejudices but neither can it tolerate them."" 2 Because it involved racial
classifications, the custody decision in Palmore was subject to strict
scrutiny."3 Gays and lesbians are not treated as a suspect class for
purposes of discrimination and therefore cases decided based on
classification by sexual orientation are not given a strict scrutiny level of
review."' However, as in Palmore, many cases regarding gay and lesbian
parents are decided based on potential for stigmatization of the child.
"'E.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 878 (Alaska 1985), D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286,
293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
106 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
'o' Id at 430.
l08 Id.
109 Id.
"
0 Id. at 431.
I. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
112 id.
113 id.
"
4Dooley, supra note 38, at 399.
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While it is not controlling, states should apply the principle
established in Palmore and reject custody challenges based on the private
biases of the parents and society. As the New Jersey Superior Court noted
in MP. v. S. P.,"5 awarding custody to the heterosexual parent will not
change the fact that the child has a gay or lesbian parent."' The child will
have to live with and deal with this fact regardless of where he or she lives;
therefore, this should not be a determinative factor in deciding custody
cases.
B. Non-Parent Custody
In a small number of cases, custody of a child who has a gay or
lesbian parent has been sought by someone other than the child's parent."17
The custody-seeking individuals have been other family members and
guardians who are opposed to having the child raised by the homosexual
parent."' The challenge for these persons to obtain custody is greater than
that for a parent seeking custody."9 Courts presume that it is in the best
interest of the child to be with a parent.'20 The person petitioning for a
change in custody in these cases must overcome the burden of this
presumption and show, by clear and convincing evidence that the parent
is unfit.2 ' Some courts have applied this burden very strictly and in line
with a nexus test.'22 As discussed below, other courts have allowed the
petitioners to overcome this burden without a clear showing of a
". 404 A.2d 1256 (1979).
"6 Id. at 1262.
"'E.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995); White v. Thompson, 569
So.2d 1181 (Miss. 1990); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980); Hembree v.
Hembree, 660 So.2d 1342 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995).
"8 Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (stating that grandparents are seeking custody); White,
569 So.2d 1181 (grandparents); Bezio,41ON.E.2d 1207 (guardian); Hembree, 660 So.2d 1342
(grandparents).
"
9 Hembree, 660 So.2d at 1344.
'
2 0 Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 104.
1
21 id.
12 E.g., Bezio, 4 10 N.E.2d 1207; Hembree, 660 So.2d 1342.
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relationship between the parent's behavior and harm to the child.23
Bottoms v. Bottoms'24 was a highly publicized Virginia case in
which custody was ultimately awarded to the child's maternal
grandmother.'5 The grandmother petitioned for custody two weeks after
the child's mother told her that she was a lesbian.'26 The trial court
awarded custody to the grandmother because the mother's homosexual
conduct was illegal in Virginia and because the trial judge believed the
mother's behavior to be immoral.' 7 A unanimous Virginia Court of
Appeals overturned the trial court's decision stating that there was no
proof of harm to the child.' The Virginia Court of Appeals' decision was
later overturned by the Supreme Court of Virginia.2 9 The state Supreme
Court stated that the Court of Appeals "failed to give proper deference.
. to the trial court's factual findings." 30 The court found proof of harm
to the child by the mother's conduct because the child, aged three,
screamed, seemed confused about discipline, and used foul language.'3'
The court did not compare this behavior to that of a typical child of similar
age. "2 The court also based its decision on the "social condemnation" a
child living with a lesbian parent may encounter.'33
Despite conflicting evidence and a trial court decision that the trial
judge clearly states includes his own biases, the Supreme Court of Virginia
gave deference to the findings of the trial court.'"' The child's
grandmother was able to overcome the higher burden of persuasion placed
on a non-parent seeking custody although the "proof of harm" was vague
123 E.g.,Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102; see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
124 457 S.E.2d 102.
'
2
' Id at 109.
"
6A Case of Justice Gone Badly Awry, Editorial, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 1995, at 20.
127 Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 109 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
128 444 S.E.2d 276,283-84 (1994).
129 Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 109.
130 Id. at 107.
'' Id. at 108.
132 Id.
133 Id.
'
34 Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 105.
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and not clearly associated with the actions of the mother.135 This burden
should be applied under a nexus test, wherein the behavior of the parent
must be proven to harm the child.
C. Visitation
When custody is awarded to the non-homosexual parent or non-
parent, on whatever basis, questions still arise regarding the extent and
type of visitation to be awarded to the homosexual parent. In general,
absent a showing of harm from the noncustodial parent, courts advocate
awarding very liberal visitation rights because it is in the best interest of
the child to develop and maintain a relationship with both parents.136
Courts can restrict visitation in a variety of ways, such as allowing in-home
visitation only,'37 daytime visitation only,38 and visitation only in the
absence of certain person(s).39 For many gay and lesbian noncustodial
parents, the question of harm becomes an important one. A number of
cases address situations where the custodial parent has attempted to
restrict visitation with the noncustodial parent because he or she is gay.' °4
As in issues of custody, courts are divided as to whether the harm to the
child must be proven or is presumed.'4
States that have refused to presume harm to the child from
1 Id. at 107.
136 Roberts, 489 N.E. at 1069; McIntyre, supra note 14, at 135.
"' E.g., Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
8SE.g., In re J.S. & C., 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
'
39E.g.,In re Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1990); Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d
1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
4E.g., J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); In re J.S. & C., 362 A.2d
54 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 984 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987);
Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995).
141 E.g., In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996), reh 'g denied, 472 S.E.2d
295 (Ga 1992) (refusing to alter visitation decree based on father's homosexuality absent a
showing of harm to the child); J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(acknowledging that some states require a showing of harm to the child in order to restrict or
deny visitation, but stating that the law of Missouri is not as such and upholding restrictions to
a visitation decree because of father's homosexuality).
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unsupervised visitation with the gay parent include Georgia. 2 In a recent
Georgia Court of Appeals decision,'43 the court held that because there was
no showing of harm from visits with the gay father, unrestricted visits
should be permitted as they would enhance the relationship between the
father and the child.'" The child's heterosexual mother appealed this
decision to the Supreme Court of Georgia, but that court denied
certiorari. 4
There is a presumption by some courts that it is best for a child not
to know that a parent is gay or lesbian."'4 The Ohio Court of Appeals held
in Roberts v. Roberts'47 that a father should be barred from telling his
children that he is gay and from being in the presence of unrelated males
during visitation with the child.'48 The trial court had refused to impose
these restrictions and the mother appealed.'4 9 The father agreed that he
would not tell his children that he is gay, but stated that if asked, he could
not lie to them.'0 The Ohio Court of Appeals remanded the case with
instructions that if the trial court was not able to adequately safeguard
against the children learning of their father's sexual orientation, then
visitation should be terminated."'
142 See In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996), reh 'g denied, 472 S.E.2d 295
(Ga 1992); see also Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); In re Ashling,
599 P.2d 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); In re Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1983); Hertzler v.
Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995). But see In re Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1990); J.P.
v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); In re J.S. & C., 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 1976); Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
141 In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996), reh g denied, 472 S.E.2d 295
(Ga 1992).
' Id. at 9.
t41 In re R.E.W., 472 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. 1996), reh g denied, 472 S.E.2d 295 (Ga
1992).
146 E.g., J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Roberts, 489 N.E.2d
1067.
47 489 N.E.2d 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
148 Roberts, 489 N.E.2d at 1070.
149 Id.
'
5
°Id. at 1069.
' Id. at 1070.
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The Missouri Court of Appeals cited Roberts in its decision is J.P.
v. P. W.1 In J.P., the court permitted a mother's request to modify a
custody decree, restricting visitation with the father to exclude the
presence of any unrelated males. The court acknowledged that some
states do apply the nexus test to custody and visitation proceedings, but
stated that this is not the law of Missouri."' The court further held that
expert testimony is not needed to prove that exposure to gay lifestyle will
harm the child."' The court based its decision to modify the visitation on
the fact that the father was open in front of the child about his relationship
with another man and that the child's behavior changed after she returned
from a visit with her father. 5' The court assumed that the change in the
child's behavior was because of the father's sexual orientation and did not
consider any other explanations.'56
Custody and visitation battles arise from disagreements between
the parents as to what is best, or even appropriate for the children. Few
disagreements have been as great as that encountered in Hertzler v.
Hertzler.7 After their divorce, the parents' lifestyles took completely
divergent paths. The mother became involved in a lesbian relationship and
became very active in the gay rights movement.5 ' The father married a
woman with strong fundamentalist Christian values. 5" The children were
originally placed in physical custody with the mother.6° This custody
agreement was contingent on the mother refraining from homosexual
relationships, so the custody was changed to the father after the mother
began her relationship with her lesbian partner. 6' Later, because the father
and step-mother had concerns over the children's involvement in various
'
52 J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 792.
153 Id.
'14 Id. at 793.
155 Id.
156 Id.
'"908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1996).
s Id. at 949.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 948.
161 Id.
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aspects of the mother's lifestyle -- including gay pride rallies and a
commitment ceremony -- the father sought and was awarded a
modification of the visitation decree to restrict the visits.162 The mother
appealed the decision and the Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the
restrictions on visitation.63 The court noted that its decision was made not
because of the father and step-mother's view of the mother's lifestyle as
aberrant, but rather because it feared harm to the children because of
confusion of the divergent lifestyles.'"
Visitation decrees must carefully balance the need for
development and maintenance of the relationships among the parties with
concerns over the child's confusion regarding the arguably conflicting
lifestyles of the two parents. While many courts advocate that the child's
best interest is served if the parent does not disclose his or her sexual
orientation, this view must be questioned. While there is no firm research
as to whether it is better for the child to know, there are many questions
regarding the wisdom of this secrecy. The parent may be compelled to lie
to the child. The child may find or figure this out on his or her own, and
may resent the parent's secrecy. There is research that shows that if the
gay parent wishes to disclose his or her sexual orientation to the child, it
is best to tell the child about a parent's sexuality either in early childhood
or in late adolescence. 6 This is much easier to control if the parent is
open with the child.
III. ADOPTION - CREATING A LEGAL PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
Gays and lesbians encounter adoption proceedings in two different
ways - - by seeking to adopt a child not related to the party adopting (so-
'
62Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 949 (stating that the visitations were "severely" restricted; that
visitation with the mother was at a "de minimis level").
163 Id at 949-52.
'u Id. at 952.
165 Kantrowitz, supra note 4, at 57 (stating that in early adolescence, children "are
struggling with their own issues of sexual identity," and therefore are more susceptible to
difficulty accepting this news about the parent).
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called "stranger adoptions")6 or through second-parent adoptions,' 7 where
one person seeks to adopt the biological or already-adopted child of his or
her life partner.' 8 Each of these adoptions carries with it different legal
issues and so is addressed separately below.
A. Stranger Adoptions
One way for gay men or lesbian women to start a family is by
adoption."69 Many men'70 not presently in relationships seek to adopt as
single parents,'7' while some couples decide to adopt together.172 Thirteen
states have explicitly allowed adoption by homosexuals.7 3 While many
other states do not specifically bar gays and lesbians from adopting, gays
and lesbians have encountered challenges to adoptions. Only two states,
Florida and New Hampshire, have provisions in their adoption statutes
explicitly denying homosexuals the ability to adopt.7  As with custody
issues, absent conclusive evidence that gays and lesbians are unfit parents,
and based on substantial evidence to the contrary, gays and lesbians should
have the right to have their adoption applications reviewed on an
individual basis. Many states have provided this right.7 1
In a challenge to an adoption proceeding by a gay man,'76 the Ohio
Supreme Court overturned a state Court of Appeals decision that held "as
"William E. Adams, Jr., Whose Family is it Anyway? The Continuing Struggle for
Lesbians and Gay Men Seeking to Adopt Children, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 579, 588-89 (1996).
167 Zuckerman, supra note 24 at 729.
168 Id.,
169 Kantrowitz, supra note 4, at 52.
17' Because the case law on this issue deals mostly with men seeking to adopt, this
section refers to the adoptive parents as males.
171 David W. Dunlap, Gay Parents Ease into Suburbia: For the First Generation,
Car Pools and Soccer Games, N.Y. TIMEs, May 16, 1996, at CI; e.g. In re Charles B., 552
N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990).
172 Kantrowitz, supra note 4, at 54.
17' Id. at 52.
74 FL. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3)(West 1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN § 170-B:4 (1994).
175 Kantrowitz, supra note 4, at 54,
1761n re Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990).
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a matter of law, homosexuals are not eligible to adopt."' 77 The adoption
in In re Charles B. was challenged by the county Department of Human
Services.7 8 The prospective parent in this case was a psychologist who
had counseled the adoptive child, an eight-year-old boy with leukemia, a
speech disorder, and possible brain damage.' According to the state
supreme court's review of the record, the prospective parent, a gay man,
had "been the one consistent and caring person in the [child's] life."'10 The
Ohio Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' decision that gays and
lesbians are not eligible to adopt as a matter of law and held that adoptions
should be examined on a case-by-case basis. 81 Since the trial court had
determined that the adoption was in the child's best interest, the adoption
was permitted. 2
In a recent landmark New Jersey case, a judge permitted the joint
adoption of a two-year-old boy by two gay men."" Prior to this decision,
only married couples could adopt jointly in New Jersey; all others had to
petition separately'1" This decision eliminated the added cost and delay
for the petitioner and promoted judicial economy.'
As stated previously, Florida and New Hampshire have specific
provisions in their adoption statutes prohibiting gays and lesbians from
adopting. A challenge to the Florida statute'86 prohibiting adoption by
... Id. at 885.
I78 d. at 884.
'
79 Id. at 884-85.
'
80 Id. at 885.
181 552 N.E.2d at 886.
182 Id. at 889-90.
183 Ronald Smothers, Court Lets Two Gay Men Jointly Adopt Child, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 23, 1997, at B5 (stating that the couple has raised the child since he was three months old);
Matthew Futterman, 2 Men and a Baby, Legally, STAR LEDGER, Oct. 23, 1997, at 1, 56; Ruth
Padawer, Victoryfor Gay Couple - Judge Sidesteps DYFS Rule to Allow Adoption, REC., Oct.
23, 1997, at Al, A16 (stating that "[o]fficials with the state Division of Youth and Family
Services have never questioned whether the two men... should be the boy's parents").
18 See Smothers, supra note 183, at B5.
Id.
186 FL. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985).
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homosexuals upheld the law as constitutional.117 In State of Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Cox,'88 two gay men
openly disclosed their sexual orientation to representatives of the Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.'89 The trial court,
relying on a recent Florida circuit court case, Seebol v. Farie,9° held that
the law "is void for vagueness and that it violates homosexuals' rights to
privacy and equal protection."'' On appeal, the District Court of Appeal
of Florida overturned the trial court's ruling, addressing each of these
issues as well as a challenge to due process.' In support of its ruling, the
court made reference to a New Hampshire opinion on the constitutionality
of that state's law restricting adoption by homosexuals. 93 The decision of
the Florida District Court was appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.'94
The Florida Supreme Court upheld each of the District Court's holdings
with the exception of the Equal Protection challenge which it remanded
for further analysis.' 9 The New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed the
same issues, and also discussed the right of freedom of association as
related to the statute in question." Each of the issues addressed by the
Florida District Court and the New Hampshire Supreme Court is analyzed
below.
1. Vagueness
In Cox, the issue of unconstitutional vagueness was raised by the
" State of Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So.2d 1210
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
188 Id.
"
9 Id. at 1212
'9016 Fla. L. Weekly c52 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991) (appendix A to Cox, 627 So.2d 1210).
'9' Cox, 627 So.2d at 1212.
I921d. at 1212-13.
Id. at 1214 (citing to In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987)).
' Cox v. State of Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So.2d 902
(Fla. 1995).
'"Id. at 903.
In re Opinion of Justices, 530 A.2d at 27.
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trial court and not by the plaintiffs.9 7 On appeal, the district court
acknowledged that the statute restricting adoption by a homosexual "does
not define 'homosexual,""9 but agreed with the appellant that the statute
can be interpreted as applying the definition used in New Hampshire.'99
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held constitutional a bill that
defined a homosexual as a person who has engaged in voluntary sexual
acts with a person of the same gender "reasonably close in time to the
filing of . . . a petition for adoption."' The Florida District Court
concluded that the rule in question was constitutional and did not concern
"a person's thoughts, but rather a person's conduct." ''
2. Right to Privacy! Freedom ofAssociation
Both the New Hampshire court and Florida District Court upheld
the statutes against challenges to a constitutionally guaranteed right to
privacy.' The Florida District Court maintained that because the adoption
statutes are designed to benefit the best interest of the child in question, the
State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (H. R. S.)
has a right to examine the background of the prospective parent. ' The
court also pointed out that the appellees volunteered the information about
their sexual orientation." 4 The court commented that "[t]hey cannot claim
an expectation of privacy concerning a fact that they have willingly
disclosed."2 °" The appellees did not object to having H.R.S. inquire about
or know their sexual orientation.16 Rather, they believed that such
information should be treated as one of several factors used in reviewing
'9' Cox, 627 So.2d at 1214.
9'Id. at 1213.
'
99 Id. at 1214.
... In re Opinion of Justices, 530 A.2d at 24.
'o' Cox, 627 So.2d at 1214.
.2 Id. at 1215-16; In re Opinion of Justices, 530 A.2d at 27.
203 Cox, 627 So.2d at 1216.
4 Id. at 1215.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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the adoption application rather than a decisive factor." ' In addressing the
privacy issue, the New Hampshire court based its decision on Bowers v.
Hardwick,?°" a United States Supreme Court case that upheld the
constitutionality of a Georgia state law criminalizing consensual sodomy. °0
The New Hampshire court viewed this case as denying a right to
participate in homosexual sodomy, but acknowledged that an investigation
into this behavior could occur only after an individual has applied to
become a foster or adoptive parent."l That court applied a similar analysis
to the question of right of freedom of association."'
3. Equal Protection
In determining whether the adoption statutes violate homosexuals'
right to equal protection under the Constitution, both courts determined
that homosexuals are not afforded protection under two approaches to the
issue of Equal Protection - a strict scrutiny basis and a rational basis
standard."' As for the strict scrutiny approach, the Florida District Court
explained that this applies only if the parties are members of a suspect
class."' The court cited several cases in which courts had failed to identify
sexual orientation as a basis for defining a suspect class and therefore
refused to extend that status in the present case."' The New Hampshire
court also concluded that homosexuals do not represent a suspect class but
gave no support for its determination.15 As to the "rational basis" analysis,
both courts reasoned that because the state has a responsibility to provide
the best possible environment for adoptive children, the decision to
exclude homosexuals from the pool of adoptive parents is part of a
207 Id.
20478 U.S. 186 (1986).
209 Id.
210 In re Opinion ofJustices, 530 A.2d at 27
211 Id.
2 Cox, 627 So.2d at 1218-19; In re Opinion ofJustices, 530 A.2d at 24.
2 Cox, 627 So.2d at 1218; In re Opinion ofdustices, S30 A.2d at 24.
214 E.g., Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
215 In re Opinion of Justices, 530 A.2d at 24.
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legitimate purpose and therefore proper.21' The New Hampshire court
stated that the exclusion is in advancement of the state's goal of avoiding
the 'social and psychological complexities' which living in a homosexual
environment could produce .... "I1 The Florida District Court justified its
decision on the theory that because most children will grow up to be
heterosexual, it is in the best interest of all children to be raised by
heterosexuals who can teach the children how to relate to the opposite
sex.21' It was this analysis that the Florida Supreme Court rejected on
appeal and remanded for further discussion.219
4. Due Process
The United States Constitution, the New Hampshire Constitution,
and the Florida Constitution each state that a person may not be deprived
of"life, liberty or property" without due process of the law.2"' Both courts
overcame this challenge by stating that adoption is not a fundamental
liberty.2 1 It was here that the Florida court pointed to the Bowers case,
stating that participation in homosexual acts is not a fundamental right.222
5. Summary
These two states have denied the right to adopt to a set of persons
based solely on their sexual orientation. No right has been afforded to
homosexuals to have their suitability analyzed on an individual basis.
Their income level, educational background, home life, and potential love
and emotional support for the child did not matter in terms of the state's
view of their ability to parent. Without evidence showing that gay and
lesbian are unfit parents it is not appropriate for the states to discriminate
216 Cox, 627 So.2d at 1220; In re Opinion of Justices, 530 A.2d at 24.
217 In re Opinion of Justices, 530 A.2d at 24 (quoting from House Resolution 32).
2 8 Cox, 627 So.2d at 1220.
219 Cox, 656 So.2d at 903.
220 U.S. Const. amend, XIV; N.H. Const. pt. I, art 15; Fla. Const. Art I § 9.
221 Cox, 627 So.2d at 1217; In re Opinion of Justices, 530 A.2d at 26.
222 Cox, 627 So.2d at 1217-18.
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against this class of individuals. These states are stereotyping gay and
lesbians, that is, they are making an unsupported correlation between
sexual orientation and the ability to parent. Gay and lesbian individuals
should be afforded the right to be considered as adoptive parents. The
forty-eight other states in the United States have not restricted this right.
B. Second-Parent Adoptions
Two people who are not married decide to have a child. When the
child is born to one of them, is each of these people the child's parent?223
If the couple is heterosexual, both may be biological parents, and they can
many to protect their legal binds to the child.224 If this is a lesbian couple,
only one woman is the biological and legal parent of the child.22
Current adoption statutes do not provide a way for unmarried
couples to protect the legal interests of each parent toward a child and vice
versa.22' Most statutes provide that if a child is to be adopted, the legal
rights of the biological parents must be terminated. The one standing
exception to this rule is stepparent adoption, whereby the spouse of the
legal parent may adopt the child, with the consent of the legal parent,
without termination of one legal parent's rights. 27 However, if the child
has two legal parents, the non-custodial parent must relinquish parental
rights in order for a stepparent to adopt.22' These statutes fail to protect
children who are being raised by two people (one of whom is not the
child's biological parent) who are in a lifetime relationship, but are not
married. The couple may not be married either because they choose not
to be, or because, as with gay or lesbian couples, the state refuses to
recognize their marriage.
The purpose of seeking legal parent status is many-fold. It serves
223 Zuckerman, supra note 24, at 729.
224 Id. at 730-31.
225 Id.; see also Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997).
226 Emily C. Pat, When Crossing the Marital Barrier Is in a Child's Best Interests,
3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 96, 96 (1987).227 Id. at 97.
228 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 476.
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the child by conferring legal responsibility on the parent to support the
child.229 It allows the parent to make medical decisions for the child.23 It
entitles the child to inherit from the parent as well as to receive social
security benefits." It provides for continuity in the child's life as the legal
parent has standing to petition for adoption or custody in the event of
termination of the relationship between the parents.232
There have been many challenges to these adoption statutes in the
interest of protecting the legal rights and responsibilities of gay and lesbian
co-parents.2"3 While some courts have refused to extend adoption rights
to second-parents,14 others have permitted the extension of rights.23
Courts have acknowledged that they are addressing issues that were not in
the minds of the legislature when the adoption statutes were created.23 6
Many courts have been willing to extend second-parent adoption
rights to same sex life partners. Of particular interest is the New York
Court of Appeals case, In re Jacob & In re Dana in where a four-three
panel granted second parent adoption rights to non-married heterosexual
couples as well as homosexual couples.2" At the time of the decision in
In re Jacob, several lower courts had inconsistently addressed this same
issue."' The Court of Appeals stated that the New York adoption statute2"
229 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397,399 (N.Y. 1995).
230 id.
231 Id.; Delaney, supra note 3, at 179; Zuckerman, supra note 24, at 742.
232 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399; see also infra section IV.
23 E.g., In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wise. 1994); In re T.K.J. & K.A.K.,
931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Tammy, 619 N.E. 2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re
B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); In re Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d
535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
234 E.g., In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wisc. 1994); In re T.K.J. &
K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
235 In re Tammy, 619 N.E. 2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628
A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); In re Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995).
236 E.g., In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1273 (Vt. 1993).
237 In re Jacob & In re Dana, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
238 E.g., In re Dana, 624 N.Y.S.2d 634 (App. Div. 1995); In re Camilla, 620
N.Y.S.2d 897 (Fam. Ct. 1994) (stating that stepparent exemption to termination of parental
rights applied to allow second parent adoption); In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Surr. Ct.
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should be strictly construed, within the legislative intent of the statute and
with the goal of "securing the best possible home for a child. 
240
Furthermore, the court mentioned the fact that the statute was last
consolidated in 1938, and thus held that there were inconsistencies that
may be difficult to sort out. 4' Such ambiguities, the court stated, are to be
resolved in favor of the child.2 2 As to whether the legal parent's rights
must be terminated in order to permit the adoption, the court cited two
situations in which this rule had been held not to apply, and concluded that
the legislative intent interpreted in these situations can be applied to the
present issue. 4  The exceptions are adoptions by a stepparent and
adoptions by a minor father of his biological child. 4 4 In each of these
situations, it was determined that the language of the statute that restricts
the parental rights of the legal parent did not apply. 45 The court reasoned
that the present cases were similar in that the child '"remain[s] within the
natural family unit as a result of an intrafamily adoption."'
In his dissent in In re Jacob, Judge Joseph Bellacosa had great
concern over judicial construct of a right to adopt.47 Judge Bellacosa
pointed to specific language in the statute that established the Legislature's
"conclusion that a stable familial entity is provided by either a one-parent
or a two-parent family when the concentric interrelationships enjoy a legal
bond. "248 While the majority in In re Jacob had acknowledged that not all
families consist of one mother and one father who are married to each
other,249 the dissent seems to advocate stripping non-traditional families of
1992) (holding that a woman can adopt child of her lesbian life partner).239 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 1 10 (McKinney's).
240 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399.
241 Id. at 400.
242 Id. at 403.
243 Id. at 403-04.
244 Id.
245 In re Jacobs, 660 N.E.2d at 403-04.
246 Id. at 403, (quoting In re Seaman, 583 N.E.2d 294 (N.Y. 1991)).
247 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 407 (Bellacosa, dissenting).
248 Id. at 408.
249Id. at 400.
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access to the legal rights that will help them provide for the stable family
environment it stated was desirable.
In contrast to those in New York, courts in Colorado and
Wisconsin have refused to construe their state adoption statutes to allow
second parent adoptions. 20 In these states, recent cases involved lesbian
women wishing to adopt their life-partner's child or children. 5' Both
states' courts refused to determine if the adoptions were in the best interest
of the child, stating that there must first be a legal right to adoption before
such analysis is needed.25 In In re T.KJ. and KA.K., 55 the Colorado
Court of Appeals stated that adoption is a purely statutory rule. 5 Because
the statute refers to stepparent adoption rights explicitly for an individual
married to the custodial parent, the court held that these rights cannot be
extended to a "spousal equivalent. '"25 The court pointed out that the family
acknowledged it would stay together regardless of the legal status of the
members towards one another. 56 What the court failed to recognize was
the need for legal parent status to protect their ability to stay together.
Writing in a separate concurrence, Judge Ruland acknowledged these
concerns, and encouraged the state's General Assembly to address the
issues raised by this decision.57
In the Wisconsin case, In re Angel Lace M, 58 the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin stated that the Wisconsin adoption statute 259 is to be liberally
construed and that the best interest of the child is the key concern for the
court.2 16 The court also recognized that the statute is ambiguous as to
210 In re T.K.J. & K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Angel Lace
M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wise. 1994).
251 In re T.K.J., 931 P.2d at 490; In re Angel Lace M., at 680.
25 2 In re T.K.J., 931 P.2d at 493; In re Angel Lace M., at 682-83.
253 In re T.K.J. and K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
254 Id. at 491.
255 Id. at 493.
556 Id. at 491.
257 Id. at 497-98.
25In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wisc. 1994).
259 WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 48.01, .81-.82 (2) (West).
260 516 N.W.2d at 681.
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which children are eligible for adoption (i.e., whether one or both parents
have to have surrendered parental rights for the child to be adoptable).26'
However, the court refused to interpret the statute such that a child is
eligible for adoption provided that at least one parent has surrendered legal
parental rights. 6' The court stated that holding as such would lead to the
absurd result of extending standing to petition for adoption to complete
strangers." 3 The court added in a footnote that although the statute does
not clearly provide for the exception that the spouse of a legal parent may
adopt the child provided that only one parent (the non-custodial parent)
has surrendered parental rights, the court's holding that both parents must
surrender legal rights to the child "obviously does not apply to stepparent
adoptions."1 It is highly questionable whether the Wisconsin court was
analyzing the correct section of the adoption statute in this case. Rather
than attempt to expand the definition of what children are eligible for
adoption, perhaps the court should have looked to expand the definition
of "stepparent" to include the life partner of the custodial parent.
IV. OBTAINNG SECOND PARENT LEGAL RECOGNITION
There are many advantages to having two legal parents. ' Among
these are the security of contact with both of those parents after the break
up of a relationship, or the ability to continue to live with one of those
parents after the death of the other. Several courts, including the New
York Court of Appeals have refused to provide for the custodial and
visitation rights of a life partner who has served as a second parent to the
261 Id. at 682., Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 48.81 (2) (West) (stating that "a minor whose
parental rights have been terminated" is eligible for adoption).
262 In re Angel Lace M, 516 N.W.2d at 682-83.
263 Id.
26A Id. at 683.
265 See supra notes 229-232 and accompanying text.
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other partner's children." The most common dynamic that courts have
addressed is one where the life partners, typically lesbian women, agree to
have a family together and one of the partners carries the child or children.
The couple's relationship ends and a custody battle ensues. This section
addresses the concerns of the "second" parent who lacks a legal right or
responsibility to the child.
Because these second parents lack legal parent status, they have
devised a number of theories to provide their parental status, including
equitable parent status, equitable estopple, in loco parentis, and de facto
parent. 7
Under the equitable parent theory, a person is granted status equal
to that of a legal parent if he or she fulfills a variety of the child's needs
"and demonstrates that (1) he had physical custody of the child for an
extended period, (2) his motive in seeking parental status is his genuine
care and concern for the child, and (3) his relationship with the child began
with the consent of the child's legal parent. '26
This is different from the equitable estoppel theory under which
one parent relies to his or her detriment on the other parent's action, such
that the one parent becomes dependent on the other parent. 69 This theory
has most often been used for the purpose of requiring a "non-legal" parent
to pay child support as the biological parent relies on the support provided
by the second parent.70 The second parent can turn this around to say that
if the responsibility to support is present, so must be the right to maintain
contact with the child. Each of these two theories has been used
2
"In reAlison D., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); Music v. Rachford, 654 So.2d 1234
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991);
Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997) (stating that the court did not have jurisdiction
to hear the request for visitation because the petitioner did not fit the statutory definition of
parent).
.67 Delaney supra note 3, at 187.
161n re T.L., 1996 W.L. 393521 *1, *2 (Mo.:Cir. Ct. 1996).
269 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 491.
171 Id.; Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
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successfully in custody or visitation cases brought by a second parent.7 '
The equitable parent theory was accepted as a valid way to
establish legal rights for a second parent in a recent Missouri Circuit Court
decision.2 '2 In In re TL.,273 the court determined that the nonbiological
parent fit the criteria for status as an equitable parent.7 4  The court
awarded physical custody to the biological mother, and legal custody to
both parents, with generous visitation by the equitable parent.7 The court
acknowledged its duty to the child and refused to deny this child and
others similarly situated' the same rights provided to children of
heterosexual marriages.7
Two trial courts have accepted the equitable estoppel theory of
parenthood in cases involving a lesbian partner as second-parent. " The
judge in one of these cases viewed the situation with the idea that he
would have granted the biological mother financial support from the
second parent; therefore, there was a legitimate relationship that should be
maintainedY.27
The two theories that have been unsuccessful in attempts to gain
legal parent status are de facto parent and in loco parentis. Under each of
these theories, the parental rights and duties are applied to a person who
has voluntarily supported or cared for a child.7
The California Court of Appeals in Nancy S., addressed several
271 In re T.L., 1996 W.L. 393521 (applying the equitable parent theory); Sabol v.
Bowling, No. CF-27,024 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Los Angeles Cty, Jan. 30, 1989) (applying the
equitable estoppel theory); Carney v. Dianna, No. 89,191,039-CE 99, 949 (Baltimore City
Cir. Ct. Jan. 11, 1990) (applying the equitable estoppel theory) (noted in Polikoff, supra note
7, at 491, 534-537).
272 In re T.L., 1996 W.L. 393521.
273 Id.
274 Id. at *2
275 Id at *5-*7.
276 Id. at *4.
277 Sabol v. Bowling, No. CF-27,024 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Los Angeles Cty, Jan. 30,
1989); Carney v. Dianna, No. 89,191,039-CE 99, 949 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. Jan. 11, 1990)
(noted in Polikoff, supra note 7, at 491, 534-37).
278 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 535.
279Polikoff, supra note 7, at 502; Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
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different parenting theories and denied legal parent status to a lesbian
second-parent under each theory.28 The first theory addressed was "de
facto parent," under which the person takes on the parental role, helping
fulfill the day-to-day needs of the child, including both physical and
psychological needs.-8 The court held that while the lesbian life partner
may fulfill this definition, this does not entitle her to custody and visitation
unless it is clearly established that the biological parent is unfit.8
A second theory advanced by the partner is that she served in loco
parentis to the children in question.1 One who stands in loco parentis has
voluntarily supported and cared for the child.'" The court in Nancy S.
refused to extend rights to the non-parent under this theory stating that is
has never been used to provide rights to a non-parent equal to those of a
parent.28 The court further refused to apply the theory of equitable
estoppel to this case, stating that this rule has not been used in California
to award visitation or custody to someone other than a biological parent.286
The court also briefly discussed the equitable parent theory, but stated that
California courts have rejected this theory for providing parental rights. 87
The hardships that may ensue for the family if the second parent
is not granted legal status can be seen in the case of McGuffin v.
Overton.m InMcGuffin, two lesbian women lived together for eight years
with one woman's children from a previous heterosexual relationship.84
The boys' father had failed to develop a relationship with his sons and was
remiss in his child support payments .2  For these reasons, the mother had
designated her partner as guardian of the boys in her will and had
'08 NancyS., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
281 Id. at 216.
282 Id.; see also, Titchenal v Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 685 (Vt. 1997).
283 Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
28 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 502.
285 Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
286 Id. at 218.
287 Id. at 218-19.
288 542 N.W.2d 288. (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
289 Id. at 289.
29 0 Id.
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delegated her parental rights to her partner through a power of attorney.,,,
When the biological mother died, the father obtained an exparte custody
order.292 The partner filed a challenge to this custody order, which the
father appealed. 93 The partner who was not a legal parent of the children,
was denied standing to appeal.294
Here, against the will of the mother, two children were taken from
the home and the second parent they had known for eight years and placed
with the father who had not developed a relationship with them.2 5 The
"parent" who had been with the boys for most of their lives was denied
standing because she had no legal ties to the boys.296 If the court had
instead applied an equitable parent standard to establish standing, the
partner should have been granted standing to appeal because she met the
three criteria to qualify as an equitable parent. She lived with the children
for an extended period of time, eight years.297 Her motivation for seeking
custody was concern for the boys.298 Her relationship with the boys was
started with the consent of the children's mother.299
V. CONCLUSION
Absent a showing of harm, it is in the best interest of a child to
have and maintain a relationship with a parent who loves that child. This
rule must hold, regardless of the race, gender, or sexual orientation of that
parent. The Supreme Court has held in Palmore v. Sidot °00 that a parent's
and society's private biases should not play into a custody battle. Many
courts confronted today with challenges to custody, visitation, and
291 Id.
292 Id. at 288.
293McGuffin, 542 N.W.2d at 290.
294 Id. at 291.
295 Id.
296 See McGuffin, 542 N.W.2d 288 at 292.
297 Id at 289.
291 Id. at 289-90.
299 Id. at 289.
300 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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adoption requests by gay and lesbian parents may not view the challengers
concerns as private bias; however, they must be classified as such. There
is strong, consistent evidence that children of gay parents fair at least as
well as their peers raised by heterosexual families. Certainly today a court
should not -- and based on Palmore, could not -- give merit to a parent's
concern about stigmatization of a child raised by a racially mixed couple,
or by a couple with different religious beliefs. This should hold true for
concerns about children raised by two men or two women.
There are a variety of issues faced by gays and lesbians who want
to parent. There are also a variety of resources available to them. Legal
expertise in this area is important as the law changes constantly and varies
greatly from state to state and from issue to issue. One must be prepared
to face the unexpected. Courts that are intolerant to gays and lesbians in
one facet of parental rights are liberal in another. Missouri has held
against gay and lesbian parents in both custody and visitation decisions, yet
it is one of the few states to have awarded visitation and legal custody to
a nonbiological second parent. Likewise, while New York is in many
ways highly tolerant to gays and lesbians, New York courts still fail these
second parents.
As the number of gay and lesbian families increase, courts will be
confronted with the reality of their existence and their issues. Education
and acceptance are the key tools for improving the legal standing of gay
and lesbian parents.
Karen Markey
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